Florida Law Review
Volume 69 | Issue 5

Article 3

Investing in the Ill: The Need to Curb Third-Party
Payment of Qualified Health Plan Premiums
Brad M. Beall

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
Recommended Citation
Brad M. Beall, Investing in the Ill: The Need to Curb Third-Party Payment of Qualified Health Plan Premiums, 69 Fla. L. Rev. ().
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss5/3

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by an
authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Investing in the Ill: The Need to Curb Third-Party Payment of Qualified
Health Plan Premiums
Erratum

1339

This note is available in Florida Law Review: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss5/3

Beall: Investing in the Ill: The Need to Curb Third-Party Payment of Qua

INVESTING IN THE ILL: THE NEED TO CURB THIRD-PARTY
PAYMENT OF QUALIFIED HEALTH PLAN PREMIUMS
Brad M. Beall*
Abstract
Hospitals and physicians have begun encouraging their high-cost
patients to switch from Medicare or Medicaid to government-subsidized
Qualified Health Plans by offering to pay their insurance premiums.
Providers make these third-party payments because insurance payouts are
much higher under Qualified Health Plans than under Medicare or
Medicaid. However, this practice is not always in the best interests of
patients, issuers, and the health-care Marketplace. This Note delineates
the regulatory responses to this issue, as well as the various advantages
and disadvantages that stem from the practice in different contexts. This
Note argues that a federal criminal statute is needed to eliminate the
harmful effects of third-party payments and preserve the positive effects
they can have in certain contexts. Finally, this Note proposes a model
federal criminal statute that can serve as a mechanism to combat improper
uses of third-party payments. In brief, this Note argues that the harms
caused by third-party payments are too significant to be ignored and urges
that a narrow federal criminal statute is the best way to address the thirdparty-payment problem.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)1 was
enacted on March 23, 2010, a flurry of case law interpreting the
legislation and defining the roles of federal, state, and local government
in the administration of the ACA has sprung into existence.2 Although
likened to “[p]atches on a patchwork” by at least one critic, the ACA, like
any other legislative overhaul, needs time, reflection, and judicial effort
to smooth down its rough edges.3
One such rough edge is the developing issue of third-party payers (i.e.,
physicians and hospitals),4 paying—directly or indirectly—their patients’
1. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
2. See generally King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2494, 2496 (2015) (holding that the
ACA’s tax credits are constitutional); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775
(2014) (holding that the Department of Health and Human Services’s contraceptive mandate
implemented under the ACA was substantially burdensome on the exercise of religious beliefs);
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594, 2600 (2012) (finding that the
individual mandate is actually a tax within Congress’s taxing powers). Additionally, by February
3, 2015, there had already been at least sixty attempts to repeal the ACA by the House and Senate.
60 Repeal Attempts for ObamaCare, OBAMACAREFACTS.COM (Feb. 3, 2015),
http://obamacarefacts.com/2015/02/03/60-repeal-attempts-obamacare/.
3. Jon Greenberg, Tom Graves Says Obama Has Changed the Affordable Care Act 19
Times, POLITIFACT (Sept. 25, 2013, 10:24 AM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/
statements/2013/sep/25/tom-graves/rep-graves-says-obama-has-changed-aca-19-times/ (quoting
Professor Ted Marmor).
4. A more precise definition of a third-party payer in this context would be anyone who
pays for the health-insurance premiums of another with the expectation that she will receive some
sort of benefit, monetary or otherwise. Physicians and hospitals (providers) are the main culprits
that this Note focuses on, but it is worth noting that some issuers have used third-party payments
to shirk their costliest policyholders.
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Qualified Health Plan (QHP)5 premiums in order to steer them away from
Medicare or Medicaid, and toward health insurance policies with higher
physician payouts.6 Physicians and hospitals prefer their patients to have
QHP coverage over Medicare or Medicaid for one simple reason—
private insurance pays more.7 It could be said that providers are investing
in their patients’ health. The problem is, they are investing in their
patients’ health in the same way that a day trader invests in the stock
market.8 Further, some hospitals and providers have begun using
nonprofit organizations to steer their patients, who may qualify for
Medicare or Medicaid, toward QHPs in an effort to provide legitimacy to
an otherwise avaricious practice.9 Moreover, the Premium Tax Credit
provides an opportunity for providers to reduce the individual cost of
covering their patients’ premiums, which provides a further incentive to
engage in this behavior.10 Unsurprisingly, issuers11 are not thrilled about
high-cost patients being steered onto their QHPs, and their frustration has
resulted in some of the first litigation on this topic.12
The third-party-payment problem does not lend itself to an easy
solution, as evidenced by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services’s (CMS)13 various responses to the growing trend.14 There are
5. See Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-1(c) (2016), referring to 42 U.S.C. § 18021 (2012). The
specific definition of QHP under the statute is unimportant for the discussion in this Note. For the
purposes of this discussion, a QHP can simply be understood as an insurance plan that satisfies
ACA requirements.
6. See Kat Greene, UnitedHealthcare Sues Kidney Clinics over Millions in Bills, LAW360
(July 1, 2016, 8:34 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/813612/unitedhealthcare-sues-kidneyclinics-over-millions-in-bills.
7. See Steven I. Weissman, Remedies for an Epidemic of Medical Provider Price Gouging,
FLA. B.J., Feb. 2016, at 23, 24 (“On average, commercial insurers pay hospitals 1.6 times
Medicare rates.”).
8. For those unfamiliar with day trading, see Allison Clare Gordon’s article, which gives
a colorful description of the practice that parallels how providers treat their patients in the context
of third-party payments. See Allison Clare Gordon, Comment, The “Day Trading” Phenomenon:
An Educated Investment or a Day at the Casino?, 30 SW. U. L. REV. 353, 353–54 (2001).
9. See Request for Information, 81 Fed. Reg. 57,554, 57,555 (Aug. 23, 2016) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 402, 420 & 455).
10. See infra Part II.
11. In keeping with the language of the health-care industry, this Note uses the term
“issuers” to refer to health insurance providers.
12. See Kat Greene, Blue Shield Sues Public Health Plan for Patient Shifting, LAW360 (July
14, 2016, 7:42 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/817563/blue-shield-sues-public-healthplan-for-patient-shifting; Greene, supra note 6.
13. CMS was originally designated as the Health Care Finance Administration, but was redesignated as CMS in 2001. Reorganization Order, 66 Fed. Reg. 35,437, 35,437 (July 5, 2001).
As a sub-agency of the Department of Health and Human Services, CMS administers oversight
of Medicare and the federal portion of Medicaid.
14. See infra Section I.A.
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legitimate concerns on both sides. America’s Health Insurance Plans
(AHIP)15 has called on CMS to prohibit providers from funding their
patients’ premiums, citing the negative effect the practice has on
insurance risk pools and national health-care costs.16 However, there is
concern that a prohibition on third-party payments will prevent legitimate
nonprofits from aiding vulnerable populations that desperately need
medical care, and thwart the ACA’s overarching goal of expanding health
coverage to more Americans.17 Additionally, some have argued that the
use of third-party payments18 could stabilize the health-care market by
encouraging price competition and better spreading risk.19 Any palatable
solution to the third-party payment issue will need to address the interest
in both protecting vulnerable patients and ensuring that insurance risk
pools and overall health costs are not adversely affected through healthcare-provider exploitation.
This Note will proceed in four Parts. Part I details the evolution of
current regulation and guidance concerning third-party payments. This
Part also addresses the significant harms that result from third-party
payments, including those experienced by individuals and the overall
negative effect on the health-care Marketplace. It also takes a brief look
at the future of regulation under the new government administration and
argues that regulation is not the likely answer to the third-party-payment
problem.
Part II introduces the Premium Tax Credit and explains its role within
the health-care market. Additionally, this Part argues that the risk of
15. AHIP is a national trade association that represents the United States’ health-insurance
community. See About Us, AMERICA’S HEALTH INS. PLANS, https://www.ahip.org/about-us/ (last
visited Apr. 16, 2017).
16. Letter from Matthew Eyles, Exec. Vice President, Am.’s Health Ins. Plans, to Andrew
M. Slavitt, Acting Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (Sept. 22, 2016),
http://assets.law360news.com/0843000/843815/final%20rfi%20tpp%20comments%209.22.201
6%20copy.pdf (“[T]hese practices are harming patients and undermining the individual market
by skewing the risk pool and driving up overall health care costs and premiums.”).
17. Letter from Thomas P. Nickels, Exec. Vice President, Am. Hosp. Assoc., to Andrew
M. Slavitt, Acting Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (Dec. 18, 2015),
http://www.aha.org/advocacy-issues/letter/2015/151218-cl-cms-9937-p-rin0938-aS57.pdf (“Any
effort to limit the ability of hospitals or hospital-affiliated foundations and other charitable
organizations to help individuals in need obtain access to health insurance coverage is bad public
policy. Not only does it undermine one of the core objectives of the ACA–making affordable
insurance coverage available to the uninsured–it also adversely impacts those who need it most,
the poor and sick.”).
18. Third-party payments are also commonly referred to as cost-sharing payments. This
Note will only use the term third-party payments for the sake of clarity.
19. See, AMERICA’S ESSENTIAL HOSPITALS, PREMIUM ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 1 (2014),
http://essentialhospitals.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Premium-Assistance-brief.pdf
(“[I]ncreasing the number of enrollees in the marketplaces through provider-based premium
assistance also can help stabilize the marketplaces and spread risk more broadly, which will attract
new plans and promote price competition.”).
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patient harm, as well as the overall cost of health care, rise when the
Premium Tax Credit is used in conjunction with third-party payments. It
concludes by arguing that Premium Tax Credits should not be allowed to
be used in conjunction with third-party payments.
Part III examines the potential benefits that third-party payments may
confer on patients. Specifically, Part III examines scenarios where thirdparty payments can be legitimately used to help vulnerable individuals
without increasing tax burdens or creating excessive health-care costs.
This Part also advances several arguments made by proponents of thirdparty payments and then addresses them in turn.
Part IV concludes by proposing a federal criminal statute similar to
the Anti-Kickback Statute that narrowly addresses third-party payments.
The overall aim of this statute is to preserve charitable giving while
addressing the need to prohibit exploitation of a glaring ACA loophole.
This Part then explains the significance of various provisions of the
proposed statute.
I. CURRENT REGULATION AND GUIDANCE ON THIRD-PARTY PAYMENTS
Third-party payments of QHP premiums are a recent phenomenon
that has become increasingly popular in the past four years. This Part
elucidates the regulatory responses to third-party payments and explains
the negative effects that this practice can have on patients and the overall
health-care market. This Part also takes a brief look at the future of the
third-party-payment problem under a new government administration.
A. HHS and CMS Responses to Third-Party Payments
In a December 2010 letter, the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) first addressed third-party payments in the context of PreExisting Condition Insurance Plans20 (PCIPs).21 In that letter, HHS
acknowledged the problems that third-party payments could cause;
namely, they have the potential for “dumping, fraud, waste, and abuse.”22
HHS also anticipated that it would issue further guidance on third-party
payments, to the extent that they unnecessarily increased health-care
spending.23

20. PCIPs were interim insurance pools established under the ACA to provide health
coverage to individuals with pre-existing health conditions, which were in use from March 23,
2010 to January 1, 2014. See 42 U.S.C. § 18001(a) (2012).
21. Letter from Richard Popper, Deputy Dir., Office of Ins. Programs, to Federal High Risk
Pool Contractors (Dec. 28, 2010), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Downloads/1228-2010portability_of_coverage-ltr.pdf.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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Congress has also participated in the development of third-partypayment regulation, to a limited extent. In August 2013, Congressman
Jim McDermott sent a letter to Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of HHS,
seeking clarification on whether QHPs qualify as federal health-care
programs on the exchange.24 The ultimate purpose of this letter was to
determine whether government subsidies provided to QHPs made QHPs
susceptible to the definition of federal health programs under the AntiKickback Statute,25 which prohibits remuneration for referring
individuals to services that are a part of a federal health-care program.26
The answer to whether QHPs qualified as federal health-care
programs was critical to determining the future of third-party payments.
If QHPs did qualify as federal health-care programs, then providers who
paid, directly or indirectly, their patients’ premiums in anticipation of
higher payouts could be found in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute,
and could face criminal penalties of $25,000 and up to five years of
imprisonment for each violation.27 A finding that QHPs qualified as
federal health-care programs could have been the demise of third-party
payments.28
However, any hope of utilizing the Anti-Kickback Statute to prohibit
third-party payments has apparently fallen flat. In a response to
Congressman McDermott’s letter, Secretary Sebelius specified that
QHPs do not fit the definition of federal health-care programs.29 The
response claims that “[t]his conclusion was based upon a careful review
of the definition of ‘Federal health care program’ and an assessment of
the various aspects of each program under Title I of the Affordable Care

24. Letter from Jim McDermott, Congressman, to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs. (Aug. 6, 2013), https://thebeatatcooleyhealth.files.wordpress.com/2013/
11/letter-august-6-2013.pdf.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(f) (2012).
26. Id. § 1320a-7b(b).
27. Id.
28. However, one could argue that the use of the Anti-Kickback Statute to prosecute thirdparty payments would be overly restrictive because of its low intent requirement. See Elizabeth
R. Sheyn, Toward a Specific Intent Requirement in White Collar Crime Statutes: How the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 Sheds Light on the “General Intent Revolution,” 64
FLA. L. REV. 449, 481 (2012) (arguing that the amendment to the Anti-Kickback Statute lowering
the intent requirement should be reversed because it unnecessarily increases health-care-fraud
litigation).
29. Letter from Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Jim
McDermott, Congressman (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.hlregulation.com/files/2013/10/TheHonorable-Jim-McDermott.pdf. This determination by Secretary Sebelius could be challenged in
the courts. So far there has been no attempt to do so, but there is always a possibility that a court
could rule against this determination. For now, the Anti-Kickback Statute will not apply to thirdparty payments.
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Act and consultation with the Department of Justice.”30 Glaringly absent
from this letter is any mention of the reasoning used to conclude that
QHPs do not fit the definition of a federal health-care program.31 In
another letter, U.S. Senator Charles Grassley expressed concern that
QHPs were not defined as federal health-care programs.32 In response,
Secretary Sebelius simply reiterated her original response that the HHS
made the determination through consultation with the Office of the
Inspector General and the Department of Justice.33
CMS also addressed third-party payments by publishing a short
frequently-asked-questions document in November 2013.34 In this
document, CMS expressed “significant concerns” with third-party
payments because they could “skew the insurance risk pool and create an
unlevel field in the Marketplaces.”35 Further, CMS encouraged issuers to
reject third-party payments and explained that it would take appropriate
action in the future, if necessary.36 Some issuers have followed this
advice.37
On February 7, 2014, CMS published another frequently-askedquestions document regarding third-party payments of QHP premiums.38
In this document, CMS clarified that their skepticism regarding thirdparty payments does not apply to payments made by “Indian tribes, tribal
organizations, urban Indian organizations, and state and federal
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. Letter from Charles E. Grassley, U.S. Senator to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs. & Eric Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice (Nov. 7, 2013),
https://thebeatatcooleyhealth.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/grassley-letter.pdf (“I am alarmed at
indications that the Administration may try to exempt the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (PPACA) from certain federal anti-fraud provisions. PPACA provides for billions of dollars
in subsidies to be paid directly to insurance companies. These taxpayer dollars should be subject
to the full arsenal of civil and criminal anti-fraud protections provided by Congress.”).
33. Letter from Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Charles E.
Grassley, U.S. Senator (Feb. 6, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/
SebeliusLetter0219.pdf.
34. CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., THIRD PARTY PAYMENTS OF PREMIUMS FOR QUALIFIED HEALTH PLANS IN
THE MARKETPLACES (2013), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/
Downloads/third-party-qa-11-04-2013.pdf.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Third-Party Payments of Premiums and/or Cost-Sharing, BLUE CROSS BLUE
SHIELD MINN., https://www.bluecrossmn.com/healthy/public/personal/home/shopplans/shopindividual-family-plans/third-party-premium-payment (last visited Apr. 16, 2017).
38. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T FOR HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THIRD
PARTY PAYMENTS OF PREMIUMS FOR QUALIFIED HEALTH PLANS IN THE MARKETPLACES
1 (2014), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/Downloads/thirdparty-payments-of-premiums-for-qualified-health-plans-in-the-marketplaces-2-7-14.pdf.
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government programs or grantees (such as the Ryan White HIV/AIDS
Program).”39 Further, CMS said that its concerns would not apply to
payments made by private, nonprofit organizations, so long as their
selection of enrollees is based off of financial status and does not consider
health status.40
Most recently, HHS published an interim final rule related to the use
of third-party payments by Medicare-certified dialysis centers that was
scheduled to go into effect on January 13, 2017.41 In the background
section of that rule, HHS identified the types of harm that third-party
payments could have on dialysis patients:
[E]nrollment in individual market coverage paid for by
dialysis facilities or organizations affiliated with dialysis
facilities can lead to three types of harm to patients:
Negatively impacting their determination of readiness for a
kidney transplant, potentially exposing patients to additional
costs for health care services, and putting them at significant
risk of a mid-year disruption in health care coverage. Based
on these comments, HHS has concluded that the differences
between providers’ and suppliers’ financial interests and
patients’ interests may result in providers and suppliers
taking actions that put patients’ lives and wellbeing at risk.42
In this rule, HHS articulated the overarching issue with third-party
payments—they are at odds with the wellbeing and best interests of
patients.43 Third-party payments also run the risk of coverage disruption,
which is problematic for all patients, but especially for those who have
high-risk medical conditions44 that require high-cost medical services.45
As discussed previously, QHP issuers are under no obligation to accept
third-party payments,46 and if they discover that such payments are being

39. Id. at 1.
40. Id. at 2.
41. Medicare Program; Conditions for Coverage for End-Stage Renal Disease Facilities—
Third Party Payment, 81 Fed. Reg. 90,211, 90,212 (Dec. 14, 2016) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
pt. 494).
42. Id. at 90,214.
43. Id.
44. In this context, these patients need constant dialysis treatments or a liver transplant to
live. This could mean deciding between paying out-of-pocket for the expensive treatment during
the gap in coverage or not getting treatment. This is not much of a decision considering dialysis
treatments mean the difference between life and death for these patients. Id. at 90,212.
45. Id. at 90,217.
46. Recall that CMS and HHS have even encouraged issuers to reject third-party payments.
See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. However, they have also carved out exceptions
for certain groups of individuals. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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made, they may—and often do—reject the payments.47
To address the risks that third-party payments pose for dialysis
patients, HHS dictated disclosure requirements for Medicare-certified
dialysis centers in its interim final rule.48 First, Medicare-certified
dialysis centers must initially disclose to new patients (and thereafter on
an annual basis) how enrollment in QHP plans “will affect the patient’s
access to and costs for the providers and suppliers, services, and
prescription drugs that are currently within the individual’s care plan, as
well as those likely to result from other documented health care needs.”49
This rule requires the disclosure to include information on the healthrelated and financial risks of both QHPs and other plans outside of the
Marketplace.50 This rule also explicitly requires disclosure of the effect
that various plans will have on transplant-related costs.51 In order to
prevent patient coverage disruptions, this rule also requires that
Medicare-certified dialysis centers develop “reasonable procedures” for
communicating with issuers and obtaining documentation that the issuer
has consented to receive third-party payments on behalf of their
enrollees.52 If the issuer refuses to accept the third-party payments, the
provider must “take reasonable steps to ensure that such payments are not
made by any third parties to which the facility contributes.”53 It is
important to note that these disclosure requirements only apply to
Medicare-certified dialysis centers who make third-party payments
directly or indirectly for their patients.54
HHS’s reasons for implementing disclosure requirements for dialysis
patients who receive third-party payments are apparent. If third-party
payments are stressing issuers’ risk pools and overall costs, then
disclosure of patients whose premium payments are being made by a third
party should lead to those issuers rejecting those payments. The patient
disclosure requirement also means that each patient would be aware of
the risks associated with third-party payments, which would likely lessen
the number of individuals who would allow third-party payments to be
made on their behalf when they might otherwise qualify for Medicare or
Medicaid. The aggregate effect of these two disclosure requirements
would be a substantial decrease in the use of third-party payments.
47. In some cases, the insurance contract includes a provision that makes the contract void
if a payment is made by someone other than the beneficiary. Medicare Program; Conditions for
Coverage for End-Stage Renal Disease Facilities—Third Party Payment, 81 Fed. Reg. at 90,217.
48. Id. at 90,219.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 90,220.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 90,219.
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Are disclosure requirements the solution to the third-party-payment
problem? Could a regulation requiring these disclosures for all providers
who make third-party payments stymy the negative effects of the
practice? In theory, maybe, but probably not in the current political
climate. For instance, although HHS’s final rule was limited solely to
Medicare-certified dialysis centers, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas recently granted a preliminary injunction that bars HHS
from implementing and enforcing the rule.55 In the Order, the court not
only criticized HHS for not following notice and comment procedures,
but also found the rule “arbitrary and capricious.”56 The court found that
HHS failed to consider the advantages of QHPs and the disadvantages of
the rule.57 Although this is merely one court’s ruling, it reflects the
disdain for health care regulation that was a pillar of President Donald
Trump’s election campaign. Indeed, President Trump’s recent Executive
Order requiring agencies to pinpoint two regulations to be eliminated for
every new proposed regulation reflects the distaste for regulatory
oversight in general.58 These examples, when viewed alongside CMS and
HHS’s piecemeal responses, suggest that a regulatory solution to the
third-party payment problem is unlikely.59
B. Regulation Under a New Administration
After a presidential election result that no one saw coming, the future
of third-party-payment regulation and the ACA in general is unclear.
President Trump originally promised to submit a “repeal and replace”
plan as soon as his nominee for secretary of HHS was approved.60
However, many, including congressmen in President Trump’s own party,
expressed disbelief that the ACA could be repealed and replaced as
quickly and easily as he claimed—they were right.61 On March 24, 2017,
Republicans had to withdraw their ACA replacement bill after they
55. Dialysis Patient Citizens v. Burwell, No. 4:17-CV-16, 2017 WL 365271, at *3 (E.D.
Tex. Jan. 25, 2017).
56. Id. at *6.
57. Id.
58. See Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Feb. 3, 2017).
59. These responses have targeted only providers that make third-party payments for some
of the highest risk patients such as dialysis and HIV/AIDS patients. See supra notes 39–41 and
accompanying text. No attempt to address the full problem has been made.
60. Dan Mangan, Donald Trump Says Obamacare Repeal and Replacement to Come with
Confirmation of Price as HHS Chief, CNBC (Jan. 11, 2017, 1:46 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/11/donald-trump-addresses-obamacare-repeal-and-replacementat-press-conference-in-new-york.html.
61. See Dierdre Walsh & MJ Lee, Trump Wants Obamacare Repeal ‘Quickly,’ but
Republicans Aren’t Ready, CNN (Jan. 10, 2017, 6:05 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/10/
politics/paul-ryan-obamacare-repeal-and-replace/.
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realized it would not receive the necessary votes.62 However, the U.S.
House of Representatives later managed to narrowly pass legislation to
repeal and replace the ACA on May 4, 2017.63 Although the U.S. Senate
subsequently mustered the votes to open debate on the legislation, a
proposal to repeal the ACA without replacement failed on July 26,
2017.64 Following that failure, Republicans again suffered a devastating
defeat when Senator John McCain cast the decisive vote to reject a
scaled-down version of the repeal and replace bill.65 After this defeat, it
is unclear whether Republicans will make further attempts to dismantle
the ACA. However, the uncertainty regarding the future of the ACA casts
doubt on what the state of third-party payments will look like in the near
future.
However, there is good reason to think that third-party-payment abuse
will remain an ongoing issue, even if Congress repeals and replaces the
ACA. Even if QHPs are renamed to something more politically
identifiable to the new administration, they will likely function in the
same manner. Perhaps government subsidies for QHPs will be eliminated
altogether. In that case, hospitals still retain an incentive to steer their
patients to private health insurance plans with higher physician payouts.66
As long as public health coverage like Medicare and Medicaid exists, so
will a need for legislation addressing third-party-payment abuse. Of
course, a repeal of the ACA would have implications for the third-partypayment problem, but the underlying issue would remain.67 The
important thing to realize is that the third-party-payment problem is a
result of a health-care loophole that is not unique to any political party. It
62. See Robert Pear et al., In Major Defeat for Trump, Push to Repeal Health Law Fails,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/24/us/politics/health-careaffordable-care-act.html. The fact that Republicans only needed to garner votes from their own
party to reach the threshold to pass the bill signals that repealing and replacing the ACA is a more
difficult task than President Trump originally believed.
63. Thomas Kaplan & Robert Pear, House Passes Measure to Repeal and Replace the
Affordable Care Act, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/04/us/
politics/health-care-bill-vote.html?mcubz=1.
64. Thomas Kaplan & Eileen Sullivan, Health Care Vote: Senate Rejects Repeal Without
Replace, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/26/us/politics/healthcare-senate-vote.html?mcubz=1.
65. Robert Pear & Thomas Kaplan, Senate Rejects Slimmed-Down Obamacare Repeal as
McCain Votes No, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/us/
politics/obamacare-partial-repeal-senate-republicans-revolt.html?mcubz=1.
66. Although their incentive may be lessened by the absence of government subsidies,
hospitals and physicians would still stand to make a healthy profit from steering their patients
away from Medicare and Medicaid and into private insurance coverage.
67. For instance, the repeal of the ACA could mean that Premium Tax Credits no longer
exist, but they are only a slight motivator for providers to engage in third-party payments, given
the amount they stand to profit from the practice altogether. See infra Part II.
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is an issue that will persist until corrected, whether the United States has
a Democrat or Republican in its highest office.68
II. THE INTERSECTION OF PREMIUM TAX CREDITS AND
THIRD-PARTY PAYMENTS
Premium Tax Credits assist those in low-income brackets with
making their QHP premium payments. However, when these tax credits
are used in conjunction with third-party payments, the financial risk to
the patient increases. Further, this conjunction increases the financial
strain on federal funds. This Part first explains the credits and then argues
that these credits should not be allowed in conjunction with third-party
payments.
A. Understanding the Premium Tax Credit
Individuals who wish to participate in the Marketplace may be eligible
for financial assistance through a Premium Tax Credit (PTC), which
provides a refund, on a sliding income scale, for low-income individuals
enrolled in a QHP.69 The overall goal of the PTC is to assist low-income
individuals who do not qualify for Medicare or Medicaid in obtaining
health coverage in the Marketplace.70 To qualify for a PTC, an individual
must: enroll with a QHP for at least one month of the year, be ineligible
for minimum essential coverage,71 pay the remaining share of premiums
on time each month, earn an adjusted gross income between 100–400%
of the federal poverty line,72 not file a married filing separately tax return,
68. When incentives are improperly aligned, problems invariably arise and persist until
addressed. These types of issues cut across the political spectrum and persist despite the coming
and going of various political administrations. One such issue similar to the third-party-payment
problem is the use of diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) to manage hospital reimbursement. See
Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical Diagnosis as a Legal Construct, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 241,
253 (1999). The use of DRGs to calculate reimbursement has led to upcoding, whereby a
physician or hospital bills for treatment of a specific disease in order to ensure payment for a
patient’s treatment, even if it is an incorrect diagnosis. Id. at 296. This practice, like third-party
payments, puts patients at risk and raises the issue of economically-motivated provider fraud. Id.
at 296–97. The upcoding issue persists, despite its lengthy existence. This lends support to the
idea that issues of improper incentive alignment, like the third-party-payment problem, will
remain until addressed.
69. Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-2 (2016).
70. Questions
and
Answers
on
the
Premium
Tax
Credit,
IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/affordable-care-act/individuals-and-families/questions-and-answers-on-thepremium-tax-credit (last visited Apr. 16, 2017).
71. For the purposes of this Note, consider minimum essential coverage to include
government-sponsored plans like Medicare and Medicaid, although there are other types of health
benefit coverage that qualify under this definition. See Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-2(c) (2016).
72. The 2016 Federal Poverty guidelines set the federal poverty line for an individual at
$11,880. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 81 Fed. Reg. 4036, 4036 (Jan. 25, 2016).
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and not be claimed as a dependent.73 Note that most individuals that
receive third-party payments are of a low-income status, so many will
satisfy the initial requirements for a PTC.74 Although PTCs can be
applied as a refund at the end of each tax year, low-income individuals
who are already struggling to make timely premium payments would
likely prefer to receive their refund through the Advance Premium Tax
Credit (APTC) option, which pays a portion of the refund directly to the
issuer each month in order to offset premiums.75
One of the pitfalls of APTCs is that the amount paid to the issuer each
month is calculated using income estimates and household information—
which are subject to speculation and unforeseen change—provided by the
individual in their Marketplace application.76 If the total amount of APTC
money paid to the issuer exceeds what the individual’s yearly income
entitles them to, then the individual must repay that excess amount to the
federal government.77 It is easy to imagine several common events that
could significantly alter the estimates provided in an initial application,
including changes in employment, marital status, or residence.78
Therefore, there is a risk that individuals who undergo any serious change
of position, and who do not request an adjustment to their monthly
ATCPs,79 will end up with a hefty tax burden.
Inefficiencies and poor administration of the APTC system have left
the door open for mistake and fraud. For instance, until April 2016, CMS
did not have an adequate process for ensuring APTC payments to QHP
issuers were made only for individuals who had paid their premiums.80
By failing to use an adequate verification mechanism, CMS invited
fraudulent reporting from QHP issuers, whose sole obligation was to

Extrapolating from that figure, 100–400% of the 2016 federal poverty line for an individual
equates to $11,880–$47,520 of adjusted gross income.
73. Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-2 (2016).
74. See id.
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 18082(c) (2012).
76. See Premium Tax Credit, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/
premium-tax-credit/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2017).
77. Id.
78. The Premium Tax Credit, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/affordable-care-act/individualsand-families/the-premium-tax-credit (last visited Apr. 16, 2017).
79. It is highly unlikely that most beneficiaries of these credits are going to be aware that
they need to ask for a reduction in their APTC payments, much less be aware that a change in
their income or household has triggered the need to do so.
80. See CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., POLICY-BASED PAYMENTS BULLETIN TRANSITION IN APRIL 2016 – INFORMATION 2
(Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/
FT_PBPGuidance_5CR_032116.pdf.
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attest that their APTC information was accurate.81 CMS did not address
this deficiency until the Office of the Inspector General issued a report
on the matter.82 Thus, APTCs used in conjunction with third-party
payments not only present a financial risk to patients who utilize them,
but also have been so poorly implemented that the potential risk for abuse
by issuers has been heightened.
B. The Use of Premium Tax Credits Exacerbates the Issues Underlying
Third-Party Payments
Provider-affiliated nonprofits can encourage patients to utilize the
APTC to decrease the overall cost of making third-party payments for
their patients. Thus, these programs make it even less risky for providers
to coordinate third-party payments through nonprofits. The reason is
obvious: Making third-party payments for patients is already lucrative for
providers, and decreasing the investment cost lessens the risk that they
will not see a return on that investment. However, this is a zero-sum
game. The money must come out of someone else’s pocket. In this case,
it is taxpayers who must bear that burden, while providers reap the
benefits.83 Due to this undeserved cost shifting alone, providers and
provider-affiliated nonprofits should be barred from encouraging their
patients to use the APTC. Accepting for a moment that third-party
payments should be allowed at all, providers should still not get to take
advantage of a federal tax credit for the purposes of exploiting an ACA
loophole. Nonetheless, there are other reasons these types of
organizations should not be allowed to use APTCs in conjunction with
third-party payments.
The strongest reason for disallowing the use of APTCs in conjunction
with third-party payments is that it heightens the financial risks borne by
a patient who is receiving third-party payment assistance.84 These
patients, who are already in precarious financial situations, may face a
hefty tax burden during tax season if their income estimates or household
81. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., CMS COULD NOT
EFFECTIVELY ENSURE THAT ADVANCE PREMIUM TAX CREDIT PAYMENTS MADE UNDER
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT WERE ONLY FOR ENROLLEES WHO PAID THEIR PREMIUMS 4–5 (2015),
https://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region2/21402025.pdf.
82. See id. at 8.
83. The costs of the PTC and APTC are already significant without the potential for abuse.
See Premium Tax Credits, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.healthaffairs.org/
healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=97 (“The premium tax credit subsidies are estimated to cost
the federal government $16 billion in outlays and $3 billion in reduced revenues in fiscal year
2014, rising to $115 billion in outlays and $16 billion in reduced revenues in fiscal year 2023, the
tenth year.”).
84. See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.
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information prove to be incorrect.85 Placing vulnerable patients in this
risky situation only serves the interests of providers.86 Therefore, if
provider-affiliated nonprofits should be allowed to make third-party
payments at all, they should pay the full price of their patients’ QHP
premiums and not unjustly put their patients in further financial risk,
while also burdening federal funds.87
III. ANALYZING THE ARGUMENTS FOR ALLOWING THIRD-PARTY
PAYMENTS
This Part first discusses the laudable uses for third-party payments as
well as several arguments that support the use of third-party payments by
providers and provider-affiliated nonprofits. This Part then rebuts each of
those arguments in turn.
A. Arguments for Allowing Third-Party Payments
Although third-party payments carry a serious potential for abuse,
some independent nonprofits use third-party payments as a way to ensure
that seriously ill and poor individuals receive the medical care they
need.88 These nonprofits use third-party payments to cover the remainder
of QHP premiums after federal subsidies are deducted.89 For instance,
one individual with multiple sclerosis, enrolled in a QHP, with an annual
income of $11,00090 must still pay a $33 monthly premium after federal
subsidies are applied.91 At first glance, this premium payment might seem
fairly low; however, this payment is a substantial burden for someone
with a serious chronic illness who is already living below the federal
poverty line.92 Therefore, third-party payments, when used for a laudable

85. See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.
86. This is assuming that if the APTC was not available, providers would still want to make
third-party payments on behalf of their high-cost patients, even though the cost of doing so would
be somewhat higher.
87. One could also make the argument that patients who have third-party payments made
on their behalf should not be allowed to reap the benefits of the PTC. The argument is that they
have not actually made the premium payments out of their limited income, so they should not be
eligible for a refund.
88. See Phil Galewitz, Insurers, Hospitals Clash over Help Paying Obamacare Premiums,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 31, 2016), http://khn.org/news/insurers-hospitals-clash-over-helppaying-obamacare-premiums/.
89. Id.
90. This annual salary for an unmarried individual is below the 2016 federal poverty line.
Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 81 Fed. Reg. 4036, 4036 (Jan. 25, 2016).
91. Galewitz, supra note 88.
92. See Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 81 Fed. Reg. at 4036; Galewitz,
supra note 88.
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purpose, can help high-risk individuals maintain the insurance coverage
they need to receive necessary treatment.93
Additionally, some argue that there are legitimate reasons for
chronically ill patients to opt for QHP coverage over Medicare or
Medicaid coverage.94 Recently, the American Kidney Fund, in a letter
addressed to CMS, argued that a final rule on third-party payments which
disallows individuals with end-stage renal disease from using third-party
payments would amount to a denial of a right to choose their health
coverage.95 The American Kidney Fund argues that this choice is pivotal
to many individuals with end-stage renal disease who may end up paying
20%96 in out-of-pocket costs with Medicare coverage.97 Additionally,
individuals with end-stage renal disease might prefer to enroll in a QHP
over Medicare because QHPs have less out-of-pocket costs for
medications.98 Individuals with end-stage renal disease may find this
consideration especially important since the disease is associated with
several comorbidities.99
There is a strong argument that prohibiting nonprofits from making
third-party payments will cause significant harm to vulnerable
populations.100 The basic argument is that nonprofits that provide thirdparty payments do so for the benefit of vulnerable populations,101 and
prohibiting the practice would unjustly strip financial assistance from
these individuals.102 In fact, CMS seemed to give that argument
significant weight when it issued an interim rule stating that Ryan White
93. See Galewitz, supra note 88.
94. See American Kidney Fund Asks CMS to Protect ESRD Patients’ Rights to Insurance
Choice and Charitable Assistance, PRWEB (Oct. 10, 2016), http://www.prweb.com/releases/
2016/10/prweb13751981.htm.
95. Letter from LaVarne A. Burton, President & CEO, Am. Kidney Fund, to Andrew M.
Slavitt, Acting Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (Oct. 6, 2016), http://www.kidney
fund.org/assets/pdf/advocacy/american-kidney-fund-comments-2018-nbpp.pdf.
96. This figure is for individuals enrolled in Medicare who reside in a state that does not
provide Medigap coverage, which covers the out-of-pocket expenses. Medigap coverage is
currently only available in twenty-seven states. See id.
97. Id.
98. See id.
99. Living with Comorbidities and Chronic Kidney Disease, DAVITA,
https://www.davita.com/kidney-disease/overview/living-with-ckd/living-with-comorbiditiesand-chronic-kidney-disease/e/4892 (last visited Apr. 16, 2017) (“Many chronic kidney disease
patients may have one or more comorbidities, a disease or condition that exists alongside another
disease. . . . Patients with comorbidities often take multiple medicines.”).
100. See Burton, supra note 95.
101. E.g., low-income and chronically ill individuals.
102. See Burton, supra note 95. A similar issue is that an overly inclusive regulatory rule or
criminal statute would cost nonprofits a significant amount of funding in compliance costs. An
overly inclusive statute could also result in nonprofits abandoning the practice altogether over fear
of litigation.
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HIV/AIDS Program beneficiaries receiving third-party payment
assistance could not be rejected by issuers.103 Here, the rationale seemed
to be that allowing issuers to reject third-party payments for people with
HIV or AIDS would unduly harm a vulnerable population.104 In that vein,
the American Hospital Association (AHA) has argued that there is no
justifiable reason to allow the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program to make
third-party payments that benefit a vulnerable population, while
simultaneously rejecting the same payments from hospitals, hospitalaffiliated organizations, and other nonprofits.105
Further, some have argued that by encouraging issuers to reject thirdparty payments from hospitals and providers,106 CMS is advocating a
policy that conflicts with the principles underlying the ACA.107 The claim
is that CMS is advocating a position that conflicts with the ACA’s
“prohibition of discrimination against individuals with certain diseases,
conditions or other significant health care needs.”108 The AHA says this
position condones the exclusion of the disabled by allowing issuers to
reject third-party premiums made by hospitals, which may be their only
way to maintain adequate health coverage.109
There is also an argument that CMS already sufficiently regulates
third-party payments,110 and therefore CMS’s ban on third-party
payments made by hospitals and hospital-affiliated nonprofits should be
lifted.111 Essentially, this argument rests on the belief that CMS’s
requirements that eligibility criteria be based solely on financial need and
not health status, and that premium payments be made for an entire
coverage year,112 are sufficient to prevent fraud and waste.113 However,
the AHA goes so far as to claim that the health status of individuals
should not generally be prohibited because it is “appropriate and logical”
to consider an individual’s health status when allocating limited
resources.114

103. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 38, at 1.
104. This is also reflected in CMS’s requirements for how nonprofits select individuals to
make third-party payments for. See id. at 2.
105. See Nickels, supra note 17.
106. See CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, supra note 34.
107. See Nickels, supra note 17.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 38, at 1–2.
111. See Nickels, supra note 17.
112. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 38, at 2.
113. See Nickels, supra note 17.
114. Id.
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B. Addressing the Arguments for Allowing Third-Party Payments
Although CMS’s recent guidance leaves something to be desired, the
contention that discrimination results from CMS’s prohibition of thirdparty payments made by providers is a stretch.115 While it is likely that
this policy may lead to some issuers rejecting third-party payments for
vulnerable individuals, the underlying reasons for this policy outweigh
the incidental harms.116 There are good reasons to prohibit providers from
making third-party payments, such as the negative impact that the
practice has on insurance risk pools, the Marketplace, and overall healthcare costs nationwide.117 Additionally, CMS has stated that there is no
prohibition of independent nonprofits making third-party payments,118 so
long as they abide by the previously discussed requirements. 119 CMS’s
guidance up to this point indicates that it does not want to impede
charitable assistance for vulnerable individuals, but recognizes that
measures must be taken to curtail inappropriate steering and fraud by
providers.120 CMS’s responses do not suggest discrimination against
vulnerable populations, but instead show a justified response to provider
exploitation of the Marketplace.121
The argument that hospitals and hospital-affiliated nonprofits should
be allowed to make third-party payments because CMS has required
issuers to accept third-party payments for Ryan White HIV/AIDS
Program beneficiaries is faulty.122 CMS appears to have made a
distinction between hospitals and hospital-affiliated nonprofits and
independent nonprofits because the risk of fraud and inappropriate
steering is distinct between the two groups.123 As previously discussed,
hospitals and hospital-affiliated nonprofits have an incentive to use thirdparty payments to steer patients toward QHP plans that have higher
payouts than Medicare and Medicaid.124 On the other hand, a truly
independent nonprofit will not have any incentive to steer patients toward
a QHP. A truly independent nonprofit assisting a vulnerable individual to
secure health-care coverage will only be concerned with whether the

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See id.
See id.
See CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, supra note 34.
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 38, at 2.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
See supra Section I.A.
See Eyles, supra note 16.
See Nickels, supra note 17.
See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 38, at 1–2.
See supra notes 4–10 and accompanying text.
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coverage is appropriate for that individual’s medical needs.125 There is no
incentive for an independent nonprofit to steer individuals toward
functionally equivalent health coverage that has higher physician
payouts. In sum, over one type of entity looms the inherent risk of acting
in the interest of profits—to the detriment of the individual—while the
other is free of this temptation.126
The argument that current regulation by CMS is sufficient to curtail
fraud and waste is also lacking.127 Although these regulations provide a
start, they would not have equal force when applied to hospitals and
hospital-affiliated nonprofits.128 The reason is simple—hospitals and
hospital-affiliated nonprofits hold too much risk for fraud and waste
because they have a profit incentive to steer patients toward QHPs.129 It
seems likely that CMS views their requirements—nonprofits paying for
an enrollee’s premiums must select enrollees solely on the basis of
financial need, and the premium payments must cover the entire policy
year—as safeguards for patients, rather than as a way to prevent provider
fraud and waste.130 Further, the supplementary argument, that health
status should be allowed in determining eligibility because it is a logical
way to allocate resources, suffers from a similar problem.131 CMS likely
excluded health status as a way to determine eligibility for third-partypayment programs because it opens the door for providers to target their
most costly patients and steer them toward QHPs, thus increasing their
payout and reducing their cost of providing medical care.132 Therefore,
these arguments should be rejected because adopting their conclusions
would only increase the opportunity for fraud and waste, as well as
perpetuate harm to the Marketplace.133
Others have argued that third-party payments confer an overall benefit
to local communities.134 When hospitals pay their patients’ premiums,
communities benefit because overall access to health care increases.135
Additionally, as more uninsured patients obtain health coverage, a
125. This assumes that the motivations of the nonprofit are pure. Unfortunately, there is the
chance that the nonprofit is fraudulently acting in the interests of a few individuals. See infra note
175 and accompanying text.
126. See Eyles, supra note 16.
127. See Nickels, supra note 17.
128. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 38, at 2.
129. See Greene, supra note 6.
130. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 38, at 2.
131. See Nickels, supra note 17.
132. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 38, at 2.
133. See Eyles, supra note 16.
134. See Catherine E. Livingston et al., Third-Party Payment of Premiums for Private Health
Insurance Offered on the Exchanges, 8 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 1, 32 (2015).
135. Id.
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hospital’s cost of care decreases.136 Proponents of this argument suggest
that nonprofit hospitals should be able to make third-party payments and
claim these payments as community-benefit expenditures on their
taxes.137
However, the nonprofit designation of certain hospitals can be
misleading, and it is a poor justification for allowing these types of
institutions to make third-party payments.138 While many might visualize
a nonprofit hospital as an institution that makes meager profits or simply
breaks even each year, this is not an accurate picture.139 In fact, a recent
study based on profits from patient-care services found that of the top ten
most profitable U.S. hospitals, seven of them held nonprofit status.140 In
2013, the nonprofits included in this list made profits from patient-care
services that ranged from $163.5 million to $302.5 million.141 While
some of these nonprofit hospitals have responded that they reinvest their
profits into programs and initiatives that improve the facilities or benefit
the public,142 critics point to rising health-care costs and question whether
nonprofits should be generating so much profit.143 Additionally, a
landmark study found that in 2009, nonprofits spent only 7.5% of their
operating expenses on community benefits, which makes it difficult to
justify the immense tax breaks they receive.144 In sum, nonprofit hospitals
are not disinterested in profits, and therefore they should not be allowed
to make third-party payments simply because they are tax-exempt.145

136. Id. This decrease in health-care costs in no way necessitates that this benefit is passed
on to the hospital’s patients. It is likely that such a benefit only confers upon the hospital itself.
137. Id. at 40–41.
138. See Lena H. Sun, These Hospitals Make the Most Money Off Patients – and They’re
Mostly Nonprofits, WASH. POST (May 3, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-yourhealth/wp/2016/05/02/these-hospitals-make-the-most-money-off-patients-and-theyre-mostlynonprofits/.
139. See id. For a more detailed discussion of the issues surrounding nonprofit hospitals and
community-benefit expenditures, see Dan Diamond, How Hospitals Got Richer off Obamacare,
POLITICO (July 17, 2017), http://www.politico.com/interactives/2017/obamacare-non-profithospital-taxes/.
140. Ge Bai & Gerard F. Anderson, A More Detailed Understanding of Factors Associated
with Hospital Profitability, 35 HEALTH AFF. 889, 893 (2016).
141. Id.
142. See Sun, supra note 138.
143. Bruce Y. Lee, Very Profitable Nonprofit Hospitals…But Where are the Profits Going?,
FORBES (May 8, 2016, 11:34 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucelee/2016/05/08/veryprofitable-nonprofit-hospitals-but-where-are-the-profits-going/#3c4de7275035.
144. Gary J. Young et al., Provision of Community Benefits by Tax-Exempt U.S. Hospitals,
368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1519, 1522 (2013).
145. But see Livingston et al., supra note 134, at 32–33.
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IV. CRAFTING A NARROW CRIMINAL STATUTE TO ADDRESS
THIRD-PARTY PAYMENTS
Independent nonprofits that operate—without ulterior motives—to
help the seriously ill and poor through third-party payments should be
allowed to do so without significant interference. These efforts represent
a contribution to society that, as a matter of public policy and general
morality, we should be wary of discouraging.146 At the same time,
providers should not be allowed to profit off the Marketplace through the
exploitative use of third-party payments. To ensure that legitimate
charities in this sector can flourish, a narrow rule must be crafted that
prevents hospital-affiliated nonprofits from taking advantage of the
Marketplace. As discussed previously, the line between legitimate and
illegitimate third-party payments is often blurry.147 Therefore, a proper
solution must put into place a mechanism that can differentiate between
legitimate nonprofits and those acting as a hospital front.
A. Proposed Federal Criminal Statute
HHS’s refusal to define QHPs as federal health-care programs has
made the Anti-Kickback Statute ineffectual for addressing the thirdparty-payment problem.148 Yet, there are compelling interests that should
be protected from third-party-payment abuse, including consumers,
issuers, and the overall health-care Marketplace.149 Given these interests,
an alternative to the Anti-Kickback Statute is needed—one that addresses
the need to protect legitimate charitable giving, while still having enough
bite to discourage third-party-payment abuse by hospitals and hospitalaffiliated nonprofits.
This Note proposes that the following criminal statute be enacted to
address the third-party-payment problem:
(A) Whoever intentionally pays an individual’s health
insurance premiums with the expectation or realization
of future profits or non-incidental benefits shall be
guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be
fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned for not
more than five years, or both for each violation.150
(B) Whoever intentionally coordinates with or utilizes a
nonprofit organization to steer an individual to
transition from public health coverage to a Qualified
146. See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 24–33 and accompanying text.
149. See discussion supra Section I.A.
150. Sections (A) and (B) incorporate some language from the Anti-Kickback Statute
relating to the fines and jail time for a violation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2012).
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Health Plan (or other private health insurance
coverage) with the expectation of future profits or nonincidental benefits shall be guilty of a felony and upon
conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$50,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or
both for each violation.
(C) In this section—
(1) The term ‘non-incidental benefits’ means any gain,
monetary or otherwise, that does not occur by
chance.
(2) The term ‘public health coverage’ means any plan
or program that provides health benefits, whether
directly, through insurance, or otherwise, which is
administered by the United States Government and
includes any health care program administered by a
state.151
(D) Exceptions:
(1) This section shall not apply to an individual who
pays the health-insurance premiums of another with
the expectation of receiving interest on the money
loaned.
(2) This section does not prevent independent
charitable organizations from recommending
health-insurance coverage to their clients or
assisting in paying the premiums and other costs
associated with that coverage. It does however
prohibit such conduct when done for the purpose of
conferring a non-incidental benefit on a hospital or
physician.
(3) This section shall not apply to employers who pay
for or otherwise contribute any portion of their
employees’ health-insurance premiums and other
health-related costs.
(4) This section shall not apply to any payment made
by a state or the United States Government related
to health coverage.

151. This language is loosely based on the definition of a “federal health care program”
included in the Anti-Kickback Statute. See id. §§ 1320a-7b(f)(1)–(2).
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(E) With respect to violations of this section, a person need
not have actual knowledge of this section or specific
intent to commit a violation of this section.152
B. Analysis of the Proposed Statute
The proposed statute attempts to limit the abuse of third-party
payments without stifling charitable giving to vulnerable individuals. To
that end, the statute is narrow in defining the types of intentional activity
that violate it, but it is broad in defining the types of expected or realized
benefits that are disallowed. The proposed statute uses the Anti-Kickback
Statute as a starting point, but then eliminates troublesome portions and
focuses the scope to third-party payments, rather than fraud generally.153
One way in which this statute departs from the Anti-Kickback statute
is in how the intentionality standard is articulated.154 The Anti-Kickback
statute uses the standard of knowing and willful conduct, while the
proposed statute simply requires that an individual perform the prohibited
act intentionally.155 The knowing-and-willful standard has caused much
ambiguity in the implementation of the Anti-Kickback Statute.156 This
confusion finally resulted in the addition of provision (h) to the AntiKickback Statute through the ACA,157 clarifying that “a person need not
have actual knowledge of this section or specific intent to commit a
violation of this section.”158 To eliminate any ambiguity as to the scienter
requirement of the proposed statute, the knowing and willful language has

152. This language was taken directly from a provision of the Anti-Kickback Statute. Id.
§ 1320a-7b(h).
153. Although the HHS has not disclosed its reasoning for finding that QHPs do not fall
under the definition of federal health-care programs in relation to the Anti-Kickback Statute, this
Note has previously identified some negative consequences that might have resulted from
applying the statute to the third-party-payment problem. Those consequences include burdening
legitimate nonprofits and preventing vulnerable individuals from receiving aid. See discussion
supra Section III.A.
154. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2012).
155. Id.
156. In 1995, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit interpreted the knowing and
willfully language in the Anti-Kickback statute as requiring defendants to: “(1) know that § 1128B
prohibits offering or paying remuneration to induce referrals, and (2) engage in prohibited conduct
with the specific intent to disobey the law.” Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1400
(9th Cir. 1995). Later courts interpreted the intentionality standard differently, causing further
confusion. United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 440 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding the district court’s
instruction to the jury that the term “willfully means unjustifiably and wrongfully” known to be
such by the defendant).
157. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6402(f)(2), 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012)).
158. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(h) (2012).
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been eliminated and provision (h) of the Anti-Kickback Statute has been
incorporated.159
Section (A) focuses on prohibiting hospitals and physicians from
paying their patients’ premiums “with the expectation or realization of
future profits or non-incidental benefits.”160 The wording here is crucial
to ensure that independent charitable organizations can help pay the
premiums of vulnerable individuals who need assistance.161 So long as
the organization or individual is not paying the premiums of another
individual with the intent to derive some sort of non-incidental benefit,
then their laudable activity will not be threatened. Here, the scienter
requirement pairs with the benefit language to carve out a space where
independent nonprofits can operate both without interference and with
certainty about the legality of their activities.162 On the other hand,
Section (A) clearly prohibits hospitals, physicians, and hospital-affiliated
nonprofits from engaging in the abuse of third-party payments that this
Note advocates against.
Additionally, the fine of $25,000 included in the Anti-Kickback
Statute has been doubled to $50,000.163 The reason for this change is
practical. Since the government must meet a high burden by showing that
a defendant committed an intentional act with the expectation of profits
or non-incidental benefits, the monetary penalty should represent a steep
enough consequence to deter hospitals from violating the proposed
statute. Supporting the higher penalty is the idea that individual
physicians and small physician groups are engaging in third-partypayment abuse much less frequently than large hospitals.164 Therefore,
the proposed statute must have fines that are large enough that aggregated
violations would pose a costly burden for hospitals that generate millions
of dollars of profit annually.165 If the higher fine deters violations, the
cost on the judicial system will be lessened.
By itself, Section (A) is not sufficient to quell all the problems
stemming from third-party payments. Section (A) prohibits third-party
payments by those who expect a non-incidental benefit from doing so.
159. Id.
160. See supra text accompanying note 150.
161. See discussion supra Section III.A.
162. See supra note 102.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2012).
164. This is purely speculative. Since the third-party-payment problem is a recent
phenomenon, there is no data on what entities most frequently engage in the practice. However,
one could argue that since hospitals are the main provider of extremely high-cost medical services
(major operations, transplants, chronic illness treatments, etc.), they have more incentives to make
third-party payments for their patients than do small physician groups who mostly refer high-risk
patients to specialists for treatment.
165. See supra notes 138–45 and accompanying text.
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However, this provision alone would leave open to interpretation whether
hospitals can donate money to hospital-affiliated nonprofits and then
have those nonprofits steer their patients toward QHPs.166 The rub here
is that Section (A) requires that the entity commit the prohibited act with
the expectation of a non-incidental benefit. It is ambiguous whether the
hospital-affiliated nonprofit is receiving a benefit here. To eliminate this
ambiguity, Section (B) finds that anyone who “intentionally coordinates
with or utilizes a nonprofit organization to steer an individual to transition
from public health coverage to a Qualified Health Plan (or other private
health insurance coverage) with the expectation of future profits or nonincidental benefits” is guilty under the proposed statute.167 Section (B)
specifically prohibits hospitals from using nonprofits to make third-party
payments, and thus closes the gap left open by Section (A). Additionally,
by using the term “nonprofit organization,” the statute quashes the
possibility that nonprofit hospitals would be allowed to directly make
third-party payments for their patients.168
It is worth noting that the definition of “public health coverage” in
Section (C)(2) of the proposed statute is an altered version of the
definition of “federal health care program” included in the Anti-Kickback
Statute.169 It has been altered to accommodate the fact that the proposed
statute is making a distinction between public health coverage wholly
managed by the states and the federal government, and QHPs, which are
merely subsidized by the federal government.
Section (D)(1) provides an exception for individuals who pay another
individual’s health-care premiums with the expectation of receiving
interest from the money lent. This exception is used to further clarify the
types of activity that the proposed statute wishes to deter. An entity
providing a loan that is used for the purposes of paying health-care
premiums is distinct from a hospital paying QHP premiums in order to
receive higher payouts from administering medical services.
Additionally, Section (D)(2) drives home the point that this statute does
not intend to prevent vulnerable individuals from receiving health-care
advice or assistance from independent nonprofits.
The aim of this statute is to encompass the issues that arise from thirdparty-payment abuse, while not disturbing the charitable activities related

166. As discussed previously, this is one way that hospitals have attempted to lend legitimacy
to their third-party-payment schemes. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
167. See supra Section IV.A.
168. As discussed previously, nonprofit status alone is a poor way to decide whether an
organization should be allowed to make third-party payments. See supra notes 138–45 and
accompanying text.
169. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(f)(1)–(2) (2012).
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to health care.170 There remains a possibility that another section could
be added after Section (B) which addresses the issue of one health
insurance provider paying its high risk (and thus, high cost) patients’
premiums if they switch to a competitor’s insurance plan.171 The
proposed statute does not directly mention this issue. However, Section
(A) seems broad enough to cover instances where an issuer wishes to
shirk the health-care costs of its most costly patients by paying their
premiums under another issuer.172 Section (A)’s inclusion of nonincidental benefits is broad enough to capture the benefit an issuer would
receive in a third-party-payment scheme involving issuer shirking.173
A final lingering concern that the proposed statute does not address is
that patients receiving third-party payments from independent charities
still run the risk of disruption of their health coverage. Although the risks
patients face from third-party payments made by providers and provideraffiliated nonprofits are much greater, they are not exclusive to those
types of organizations. Charities sometimes go bankrupt, and such an
occurrence could mean that patients relying on third-party payments from
such a charitable organization could be put in a precarious situation.174
Even worse, sometimes charities are fraudulent money-making schemes
from the start.175 In addition to the proposed statute, one solution could
be to enact a broad regulation requiring any organization that makes
third-party payments on behalf of a patient to disclose certain
information, as HHS recently attempted to do.176 Such a regulation could
provide information that at least makes patients aware of the risks that
170. These are the two main aims of the statute. Added benefits of the statute are that it would
eliminate excessive payment of QHP subsidies to issuers, as well as excessive payment of PTCs
and APTCs to individuals. This equates to a lesser burden on federal funds.
171. Litigation on this issue is currently underway in California. Complaint at 1–2, Cal.
Physicians’ Serv. v. Santa Barbara San Luis Obispo Reg’l Health Auth., No. CGC-16-552950
(Cal. Super. Ct. July 11, 2016).
172. This issue is new enough that there is not enough data to know how often this practice
occurs. However, it seems likely that providers would be more hesitant to engage in the practice
because it presumably has higher litigation risks. In other words, large issuers are more likely to
have the resources and desire to sue one another than patients are to sue large issuers.
173. In other words, a decrease in the costs associated with paying for medical treatments
for high-risk patients through steering those patients to a competitor through third-party payments
should be covered by the definition of non-incidental benefits in Section (C)(1).
174. See Medical Charity WonderWork Files for Bankruptcy Protection, 4-TRADERS (Dec.
30, 2016, 10:06 AM), http://www.4-traders.com/news/Medical-Charity-WonderWork-Files-forBankruptcy-Protection--23629084/ (discussing a charity going bankrupt that provided free
surgeries to children and adults).
175. See Mark Iandolo, Cancer Fund of America, Cancer Support Services to be Dissolved,
LEGAL NEWSLINE (Apr. 1, 2016, 12:09 PM), http://legalnewsline.com/stories/510705034-cancerfund-of-america-cancer-support-services-to-be-dissolved.
176. See supra notes 48–54 and accompanying text.
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authorizing any third-party payment runs.177 However, such a regulation
may not be achievable under the current administration.178
CONCLUSION
Current regulation provides minimal guidance on third-party
payments of QHP premiums. Regulations and guidance provided on the
issue have been piecemeal and somewhat inconsistent. High-risk patients
currently have minimal protection from the risks associated with the
third-party-payment problem. Cost-shifting continues to harm the
Marketplace. As it stands, the law does nothing to de-incentivize this
predatory practice.
A narrow federal criminal statute barring the use of third-party
payments by providers and provider-affiliated nonprofits would have a
positive impact on not only high-risk patients, but the Marketplace as a
whole. Such a statute would negate the improperly aligned incentives that
underlie the third-party-payment problem. While the proposed statute
cannot force providers to realize that their patients are human beings that
should not be treated as investments, it can deter and offer the recourse
necessary to punish those that do so.

177. These disclosures seem like a good idea considering that many Americans are perplexed
by the health care system in general, much less a complex, developing portion of it. See Kyle
Dropp & Brendan Nyhan, One-Third Don’t Know Obamacare and Affordable Care Act Are the
Same, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/upshot/one-third-dontknow-obamacare-and-affordable-care-act-are-the-same.html
(“[Thirty-five]
percent
of
respondents [to a poll] said either they thought Obamacare and the Affordable Care Act were
different policies (17 percent) or didn’t know if they were the same or different (18 percent).”).
178. See supra notes 48–59 and accompanying text.
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